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Introduction
Women lag men in wages and wealth. Women earn 81 percent as much as 
similarly situated men,1
 
and they own only 32 percent of the wealth that men 
own.2
 
Lawyers are no different. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, female 
lawyers make 77 percent as much as their male peers,3
 
and according to the 
National Association of Women Lawyers, female equity partners make almost 
$100,000 less each year than their male peers.4
 
Because wage gaps lead to 
wealth gaps, female lawyers accrue less wealth than their male counterparts.
1. Sonam Sheth et al., 6 Charts Show How Much More Men Make than Women, Bus. InsIder (Aug. 27, 2018, 
10:50 AM), https://www.insider.com/gender-wage-pay-gap-charts-2017-3?utm_source=copy-
link&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=topbar (generating graphs of the data from the 
U.S. Census Bureau). This wage gap is projected to continue through 2059. See also Julie 
Anderson et al., Projected Year the Wage Gap Will Close by State, Inst. Women’s Pol’y res. (Mar. 
22, 2017), https://iwpr.org/publications/projected-year-wage-gap-will-close-state/.
2. Heather McCulloch, Closing the Women’s Wealth Gap: What It Is, Why It Matters, and What Can Be 
Done About It 2 (2017), https://womenswealthgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Closing-
the-Womens-Wealth-Gap-Report-Jan2017.pdf.
3. Debra Cassens Weiss, Full-Time Female Lawyers Earn 77 Percent of Male Lawyer Pay, ABA J. (Mar. 
17, 2016, 8:10 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/pay_gap_is_greatest_
in_legal_occupations. See also Mark A. Cohen, Why Does the Gender Wage Gap Persist in Law?, 
https://www.legalmosaic.com/why-does-the-gender-wage-gap-persist-in-law/ (Apr. 3, 2018) 
(reporting several studies showing that female lawyers earn less than similarly situated male 
lawyers); Erin C. Cowling, Ending the Gender Pay Gap in Law, ABA l. PrAc. todAy (Feb. 14, 
2018), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/ending-gender-pay-gap-law/ (reporting a 
study by Major, Lindsey & Africa showing that female partners in London law firms earn 
24% less in compensation than their male counterparts); Lizzy McLellan, Amid Gender Pay 
Gap Disclosures, Law Firms Keep U.S. Data Under Wraps, Am. lAW. (Mar. 30, 2018) (documenting 
pay gaps at law firms in the United Kingdom).
4. Destiny Peery, Report of the 2018 NAWL Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms, 
103 Women lAW. J. 22, 34 (2018). See also Dan Packel, New Survey Finds Even Bigger Gender 
Gap in Big Law Partner Pay, Am. lAW. (Dec. 6, 2018, 9:20 AM), https://www.law.com/
americanlawyer/2018/12/06/new-data-finds-even-bigger-gender-gap-in-law-firm-partner-
pay/ (finding a 53% gap in partner compensation based on gender).
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Gender gaps in wages and wealth are well known5
 
and have attracted 
widespread attention. In the past year alone, The American Lawyer, The Economist, 
Money, Forbes, Time, U.S. News, and other media outlets have highlighted them.6
 
Likewise, policymakers have tried to address them legislatively.7
 
California, 
for example, requires employers to pay equal wages to employees doing 
substantially similar work8
 
and recently enacted a law calling for publicly 
traded companies to include at least one woman on their boards of directors.9
 
Advocacy organizations have also taken up the cause. For example, the 
National Committee on Pay Equity (NCPE)10
 
recognizes “Equal Pay Day” 
every April to highlight how many months a woman must work each year to 
earn what a similarly situated man earned in the prior year.11
Although gender gaps in wages and wealth have attracted much attention, 
another gender gap has escaped notice. This gap, which we call the “aid 
gap,” arises from the practice of merit scholarship negotiation in law schools 
and directly affects law students and lawyers. Many law schools award extra 
merit scholarship money to those admitted students who seek to negotiate 
for additional aid. The onus to initiate negotiation rests on the students, and 
researchers have consistently found that men are significantly more likely than 
women to initiate negotiation.
5. See, e.g., JPmorgAn chAse, The Gender Wealth Gap is Even More Concerning than the Wage Gap. Here’s 
Why, the lIly (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.thelily.com/brandstudio/the-gender-wealth-gap-
is-even-more-concerning-than-the-wage-gap-heres-why/; Diana Farrell & Fiona Greig, The 
Gender Gap in Financial Outcomes: The Impact of Medical Payments, JPmorgAn chAse & co. Inst. 
(2017).
6. See, e.g., Packel, supra note 4; Forcing Employers to Reveal Their Gender Pay Gaps is Making Them Think, 
the economIst (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.economist.com/britain/2018/04/07/forcing-
employers-to-reveal-their-gender-pay-gaps-is-making-them-think; Kaitlin Mulhere, Here 
is the Gender Pay Gap in Every U.S. State – and What Could Be Behind It, money (Apr. 10, 2018), 
http://money.com/money/5233753/gender-pay-gap-every-state/; Lisa Rabasca Roepe, 3-Year 
Study Finds Gender Wage Gap Widening: Here’s How To Close It, ForBes (Apr. 10, 2018, 8:03 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisaroepe/2018/04/10/three-year-study-finds-gender-wage-
gap-widening-heres-how-to-close-it/#2431e368236d; Krystal Chia, It Could Take 202 Years 
for Women to Earn as Much as Men, tIme (Dec. 18, 2018, 8:37 AM), http://time.com/5482285/
women-men-gender-pay-gap-202-years/; Casey Leins, Gender Pay Gap Virtually Unchanged 





7. See McCulloch, supra note 2, at 4-6.
8. cAl. lAB. code § 1197.5 (West 2019).
9. Julia Carpenter & Jackie Wattles, California Has a New Law: No More All-Male Boards, cnn Bus. 
(Oct. 3, 2018, 8:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/30/business/california-requires-
women-board-of-directors/index.html.




Because men are more likely to negotiate,12
 
male law students are likely 
receiving more than their fair share of scholarship aid at many law schools. 
This, in turn, means that women may be subsidizing the legal education of 
their male classmates.
This is particularly troubling because female law students often enter law 
school at a financial disadvantage to their male peers.13
 
According to the 
American Association of University Women (AAUW), women hold nearly 
two-thirds of outstanding student loan debt even though they comprise only 
56 percent of college graduates.14
 
If the women applying to law school receive 
smaller scholarships than their male peers and have to borrow more money 
to pay for their legal education, their already greater debt burden will only 
deepen while they pursue a JD.
In this Essay, we criticize merit scholarship negotiation on disparate impact 
grounds. We begin in Part I by describing the practice of merit scholarship 
negotiation. In Part II, we explain why this process can lead to a gender-based 
aid gap. In so doing, we rely on a rich literature on gender in negotiation, 
focusing particularly on the literature documenting gender-based differences 
in the initiation of negotiation. Then, in Part III, we recommend that the 
American Bar Association (ABA) act to address the aid gap. We begin by 
arguing that the ABA should ban merit scholarship negotiation altogether––
an action that falls within the ABA’s accrediting authority and that would 
eliminate the gap. In the event the ABA is unwilling or unable to ban merit 
scholarship negotiation, we recommend that the ABA follow the approach it 
has taken with so-called “conditional scholarships” and mandate disclosure. 
While mandatory disclosure might not fully eliminate the aid gap, it would 
inform admitted students of each school’s merit scholarship negotiation 
practices and outcomes, and this awareness should at least reduce the aid gap. 
Finally, we conclude our Essay by observing that the aid gap is likely part 
of a much larger problem affecting other less advantaged populations and 
impacting students enrolling in other degree programs. By taking a strong 
stance against merit scholarship negotiation in legal education, the ABA, the 
Law School Admissions Council (LSAC), and the law schools themselves can 
become role models for all of higher education.
12. lIndA BABcock & sArA lAschever, Women don’t Ask: negotIAtIon And the gender 
dIvIde (2003).
13. Annie Nova, Women Have $890 Billion in Student Load Debt, the Country’s Biggest Share, CNBC (June 
6, 2018, 1:22 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/why-women-hold-the-majority-of-
student-loans.html (showing that women are more likely to accrue more debt than men 
pursuing their undergraduate degree).
14. See Am. Ass’n u. Women, deePer In deBt: Women And student loAns 35 (2018), https://
www.aauw.org/app/uploads/2020/03/DeeperinDebt-nsa.pdf. The AAUW’s analysis also 
found that upon completion of a bachelor’s degree, black women took on “more student 
debt on average than the members of any other group.” Id. at 2. Additionally, it took Hispanic 
and black women longer to repay their student loans than white or Asian borrowers. Id. This 
suggests that a gender disparity within negotiation practices, would further disadvantage 
minority students.
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I. Merit Scholarship Negotiation
In the wake of the Great Recession and the resulting collapse in the JD 
applicant pool, law schools have dramatically increased the amount of money 
they devote to scholarships.15 While this increase in aid has benefitted many 
law students, law schools have come under attack for the way they allocate 
that aid. Rather than awarding aid based on student and family need, law 
schools are now more likely to award aid based on a student’s academic 
record––primarily undergraduate performance and LSAT score.16
Commentators have expressed concern about this shift in aid practices, 
arguing that the least advantaged students are now subsidizing the most 
advantaged students.17
 
In the 2016 Law School Survey of Student Engagement, 
for example, Aaron Taylor argues that “law school scholarships flow most 
generously to students with the least financial need and least generously to 
those with the most need,” thereby exacerbating “preexisting privilege and 
disadvantage, setting the stage for long-term disparities in experiences and 
outcomes.”18
 
On this telling, the law school admissions office, which once 
played the role of a benefactor seeking to award aid to those least able to pay, 
has morphed into a talent scout, seeking to distribute aid based on seemingly 
objective measures of merit (however imperfect those measures might be).
While some commentators have bemoaned the replacement of need-based 
aid with merit-based aid, they have ignored another aid practice that is likely 
to lead to a different kind of disparate impact: merit scholarship negotiation. 
At many law schools, scholarship awards are based not only on an applicant’s 
seemingly objective credentials but also on negotiations between law schools 
and admitted students.19
 
These schools offer initial aid awards below what the 
merits justify in order to remain within their scholarship budgets and to leave 
room to negotiate with those students who have the temerity to negotiate with 
them. Scholarship offers, in short, are viewed as opening offers in a negotiation 
rather than merit-based awards. Here, then, the law school admissions office 
morphs from talent scout to used car salesperson, selling law school at a 
steeper discount to the admitted students who have the gumption to haggle.
15. Chelsea Phipps, More Law Schools Haggle on Scholarships, WAll street J. (July 29, 2012, 9:23 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444130304577557182667927226.
16. l. sch. surv. student engAgement, lAW school scholArshIP PolIcIes: engInes oF 
InequIty 7–10 (2016), http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/LSSSE-2016-
Annual-Report-1.pdf.
17. See id. at 6 (Aaron Taylor, LSSSE’s former director, observing that the shift from need-based 
to merit-based aid has resulted in a law school landscape in which “the most disadvantaged 
students subsidize the attendance of their privileged peers”); Aaron N. Taylor, Robin Hood, in 
Reverse: How Law School Scholarships Compound Inequality, 47 J.l. & educ. 41, 48 (2018) (arguing 
that the LSAT has resulted in a “‘reverse Robin Hood’ cost-shifting strategy through which 
disadvantaged students subsidize the tuition of their peers from privileged backgrounds”).
18. l. sch. surv. student engAgement, supra note 16, at 6.
19. See Phipps, supra note 15.
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Consider the following hypothetical to illustrate how this process unfolds:
Imagine two students: Jason, a male, and Jennifer, a female. Suppose 
that Jason and Jennifer attended similarly ranked colleges, majored in Civil 
Engineering, and achieved identical GPAs and LSAT scores. Rather than 
pursue careers as engineers, suppose that Jason and Jennifer decide to apply 
to law school.
Jason and Jennifer would both like to attend School X, a private school that 
charges $50,000 in tuition and reports a total cost of attendance of $70,000. 
Both Jason and Jennifer have GPAs that exceed School X’s median GPA 
target, but they possess LSAT scores that fall well below School X’s median 
LSAT.
School X admits both Jason and Jennifer and offers each of them a $10,000 
merit scholarship. In extending its aid offers, School X does not indicate that 
the $10,000 scholarships are “opening offers” or that the scholarships are 
“negotiable” but simply presents the $10,000 scholarships to the admitted 
students. School X waits anxiously for Jason and Jennifer to accept their offers 
of admission and to pay deposits to hold their spots in the incoming 1L class.
Like the modal law applicant, Jason and Jennifer applied to other law 
schools.20
 
Among these, Jason and Jennifer applied to School Y, a school that 
bears some resemblance to School X. Like School X, School Y is a private 
school, enjoys a comparable ranking, charges $50,000 in tuition, and reports 
an overall cost of attendance of $70,000. School Y awards each student a 
$25,000 scholarship.
Even after receiving School Y’s aid offer, Jason and Jennifer both prefer 
School X. Behaving in a gender stereotypical way, Jason contacts School X, 
informs School X of his scholarship offer from School Y, and asks School X to 
increase his aid offer. School X matches School Y’s $25,000 scholarship offer, 
and Jason happily pays his deposit and enrolls at School X. Jennifer, also 
behaving in a gender stereotypical way, does not perceive this as a situation 
that calls for negotiation, so she accepts School X’s opening scholarship offer 
of $10,000, and she, too, pays her deposit and attends School X.
Because Jason negotiated and Jennifer did not, Jennifer pays $15,000 more 
per year for her JD than Jason pays for his. Assuming she borrows to finance 
the additional $45,000, consolidates the debt at a 7 percent interest rate, and 
amortizes the debt over a 25-year period, she will pay nearly $100,000 more 
than Jason pays for the JD.
This is the gender-based aid gap of concern in this Essay.
20. Mike Spivey, How Many Law Schools Should You Apply To? (June 28, 2018), https://blog.
spiveyconsulting.com/how-many-law-schools-should-i-apply-to/ (“According to LSAC, the 
average applicant applies to about six law schools.”).
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II. The Asking Gap
Negotiation scholars have developed a robust research literature on gender 
and negotiation.21
 
There is an active debate about the impact of gender on 
various aspects of the negotiation process,22
 
but there is little disagreement 
over the existence of a gender-based “asking gap” between men and women.23
Women are less likely to initiate negotiation than men. As the leading 
researcher in the field puts it, “women don’t ask.”24
In the foundational exploration of this phenomenon, Linda Babcock 
examined the starting salaries of MBA students graduating from Carnegie 
Mellon University (CMU) and discovered that men were eight times more 
likely than women to negotiate their salaries.25
 
Even though CMU “strongly 
advised” all students to negotiate their offers,26
 
only seven percent of women––
as compared to 57 percent of men––initiated negotiation. Those who did 
increased their starting salaries more than seven percent––just around the 
average salary difference between men and women at the time.27
In a similar real-world study, Babcock and her colleagues, Michele Gelfand, 
Deborah Small, and Heidi Stayn, surveyed several hundred adults and asked 
them to recall the most recent negotiation they had initiated or attempted. 
Men reported that they had initiated a negotiation two weeks earlier versus 
21. See sherly sAndBerg, leAn In: Women, Work, And the WIll to leAd (2013); BABcock & 
lAschever, supra note 12.
22. See Mary Al Dabbagh et al., Status Reinforcement in Emerging Economies: The Psychological Experience 
of Local Candidates Striving for Global Employment, 27 org. scI. 1453, 1454 (2016) (identifying the 
cues and circumstances that intensify gender differences in negotiation outcomes); Emily 
T. Amanatullah & Catherine H. Tinsley, Punishing Female Negotiators for Asserting Too Much…
or Not Enough: Exploring Why Advocacy Moderates Backlash Against Assertive Female Negotiators, 120 
org. BehAv. & hum. decIsIon Processes 110, 111–12 (2013) (studying how negotiations are 
differentially judged by others on the basis of gender); Julia Bear, “Passing the Buck”: Incongruence 
Between Gender Role and Topic Leads to Avoidance of Negotiation, 4 neg. & conFlIct mgmt. res. 47, 
55–56 (2011) (finding that women are significantly more likely to pass off negotiation than 
men on topics of compensation); Emily T. Amanatullah & Michael W. Morris, Negotiating 
Gender Roles: Gender Differences in Assertive Negotiating are Mediated by Women’s Fear of Backlash and 
Attenuated When Negotiating on Behalf of Others, 98 J. PersonAlIty & soc. Psych. 256, 257–58 
(2010) (identifying gender-based disparities in negotiation that work to the disadvantage of 
women).
23. Andrea Schneider questions the inferences that can reasonably be drawn from this vast 
literature, largely because the research is focused primarily on negotiations over money, 
undergraduate or young graduate students, and “one- off” transactions. But in the case of 
merit scholarship negotiation, her questions do not apply, as it is students who are deciding 
whether or not to initiate one-time financial negotiations. Andrea Schneider, Negotiating While 
Female, 70 s.m.u. l. rev. 695, 698-700 (2017) (arguing that conceptual and methodological 
problems in negotiation studies have created the myth that women simply do not negotiate)..
24. See BABcock & lAschever, supra note 12.




a month earlier for women. When asked to identify the second-most recent 
negotiation they recalled initiating, men reported that they had initiated a 
negotiation 7 weeks earlier versus 24 weeks earlier for women.28
These field data are both suggestive and troubling—indicating that “men 
are asking for things they want and initiating negotiations much more often 
than women”29—but the observed differences might reflect something other 
than, or in addition to, gender. To isolate the impact of gender on propensity 
to negotiate, Babcock and other researchers in the field have also conducted 
numerous controlled experiments.30
 
These experiments, like the field data, 
reveal significant differences between men and women.
In one illustrative study, researchers asked students at CMU to play Boggle, 
a game in which players try to form as many words as possible out of letter 
sequences depicted on dice.31
 
Each student played four rounds of Boggle after 
which an experimenter offered three dollars and inquired if this amount 
was okay.32
 
The men and women evaluated their performance in the game 
similarly and expressed similar levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the compensation, but the men were nine times more likely than their female 
counterparts to ask for more money. As a result, the difference between the 
men and women “seemed to be that for men, unhappiness with what they were 
offered was more likely to make them try to fix their unhappiness—by asking 
for more.”33
To attempt to assess the overall effect of gender on the propensity to 
initiate negotiations, researchers recently conducted a meta-analysis––or a 
study of studies––in which they analyzed 55 studies involving 17,504 study 
participants. Across these studies, they found that women were significantly 
less likely than men to initiate negotiation.34
 
They also examined moderator 
variables and found that gender differences were far smaller in certain 
circumstances, notably when there was minimal situational ambiguity about 
28. Id. at 2–3. See also Fiona Greig, Propensity to Negotiate and Career Advancement: Evidence from an 
Investment Bank that Women Are on a “Slow Elevator”, 24 neg. J. 495 (2008) (finding that women 
working at a major investment bank had a lower propensity to negotiate than men and that 
this asking gap correlated to men receiving promotions an average of seventeen months 
sooner).
29. BABcock & lAschever, supra note 12, at 3.
30. See, e.g., Deborah A. Small et al., Who Goes to the Bargaining Table? The Influence of Gender and Framing 
on the Initiation of Negotiation, 93 J. PersonAlIty & soc. Psych. 600, 601 (2007) (finding that 
when situations are framed as an opportunity to ask rather than to negotiate, women were just 
as likely to initiate as men).
31. Id. at 603–04.
32. Id. at 603–07.
33. See BABcock & lAschever, supra note 12, at 2.
34. Katharina G. Kugler et al., Gender Differences in the Initiation of Negotiations: A Meta-Analysis, 144 
Psych. Bull. 198, 210, 214 (2018).
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the appropriateness of initiating negotiation35
 
and when the situational cues 
aligned with a stereotypical female gender role rather than a stereotypical male 
gender role.36
 
But in the main, they found that “women are less likely to initiate 
negotiation than men” and estimated that “men initiate negotiations roughly one and 
a half times more often than women.”37
Likewise, in the academy, researchers have assessed differences in the 
propensity of students to request and receive grade changes from their 
instructors. The researchers found that male students were 18.6 percent more 
likely than female student to receive grade changes.38 In a follow-up survey of 
students and instructors, the researchers found that male students were more 
likely than female students to have asked for these grade adjustments.39
Researchers have not tested law applicants, but the population of men 
and women applying to law school is likely very similar to the populations 
previously studied. Most studies have involved college students, some portion 
of whom undoubtedly enrolled in law school, and other populations of 
graduate students.40
 
In age, education level, life experience, and socioeconomic 
status, these populations are similar to, and in some cases include, law school 
applicants. While we recognize that law school graduates might differ from these 
populations based on the training they receive in law school, there is no reason 
to believe law school applicants do. Stated differently, the asking gap is just as 
likely to affect prospective law students as the students who have participated 
in prior studies.
Researchers hypothesize that this asking gap reflects internalized gender 
roles41
 
as well as an aversion to negotiation in some contexts due to fear of social 
backlash associated with behaving contrary to gender stereotypes.42
 
Whatever 
35. Id. at 206–07, 213.
36. Id. at 207–08, 213–14.
37. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
38. Paul Caron, Male Students Ask For – And Get – Grade Changes Far More Frequently Than Female Students, 
tAxProF Blog (Feb. 25, 2020), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2020/02/male-
students-ask-for-and-get-grade-changes-far-more-frequently-than-female-students.html.
39. Id.
40. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider et al., Likeability v. Competence: The Impossible Choice Faced by Female 
Politicians, Attenuated by Lawyers, 17 duke J. gender l. & Pol’y 363, 381 (2010); Kugler et al., 
supra note 34, at 200–03 (twenty-three of forty-seven studies included within the meta-analysis 
were focused upon a sample comprised exclusively of students).
41. Under social role theory, beliefs about gender role arise when individuals observe gender-
specific behavior and infer that men and women have distinct social roles within their 
society. Once these gender role beliefs are internalized, they become a part of an individual’s 
identity and begin to guide their behavior. See Schneider, supra note 23, at 701–02; Wendy 
Wood & Alice H. Eagly, Two Traditions of Research on Gender Identity, 73 FemInIst F. rev. ArtIcle 
461, 462–63 (2015).
42. The “backlash effect” is a social sanction of sorts that arises when an individual violates 
one’s gender role expectations. See Amanatullah & Morris, supra note 22, at 257–58. See also 
Amanatullah & Tinsley, supra note 22, at 111–12.
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the underlying explanations, the asking gap exists. The research suggests that 
male law school applicants may be one-to-two times more likely than female 
applicants to try to negotiate for additional merit scholarship money.
III. Closing the Aid Gap
The gender-based wage and wealth gaps that have attracted so much 
attention in recent years have proven persistent, but there is nothing inexorable 
or inevitable about the aid gap identified in this Essay. We can easily eliminate 
or at least minimize the aid gap, and we urge the American Bar Association 
to do so.
A. ABA Ban
The ABA is the authorized accrediting agency for U.S. law schools. In 
performing its accrediting role, the ABA promulgates minimum “standards” 
that it regularly reviews and revises.43
 
In recent years, the ABA has been 







We urge the ABA to amend Chapter 5 of the Standards to prohibit Law 
Schools from engaging in merit scholarship negotiation. The ABA is not 
averse to taking a “command-and- control” approach in which it prohibits some 
behaviors and requires others. For example, the ABA requires law schools to 
admit only those applicants who appear capable of completing the degree and 
passing the bar.47
 
It prohibits law schools from admitting applicants who have 
not taken a valid and reliable entrance test.48
 
It requires law schools to provide 
debt counseling to student borrowers at the beginning and end of the degree 
program.49
 
And it requires law schools to “demonstrate by concrete action a 
commitment to diversity and inclusion.”50
43. ABA sec. oF legAl educ. And AdmIssIons to the BAr, ABA stAndArds And rules oF 
Procedure For APProvAl oF lAW schools (2019–2020), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/legal_education/resources/standards/ [hereinafter ABA stAndArds And rules].
44. Id. at 15–16 (Standard 301. Objectives of Program of Legal Education and Standard 302. 
Learning Outcomes).
45. Id. at 16–18 (Standard 303. Curriculum and 304. Experiential Courses: Simulation Courses, 
Law Clinics, and Field Placements).
46. Id. at 33–34 (Standard 509. Required Disclosures and Interpretation 509-2). See also ABA sec. oF 
legAl educ. And AdmIssIons to the BAr, 2018 emPloyment questIonnAIre: deFInItIons 
& InstructIons (2018), https://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/10376/
aba_2018_employment_questionnaire_definitions_and_instructions.pdf.
47. ABA stAndArds & rules, supra note 43, at 29 (Standard 501(b). Admissions).
48. Id. at 31 (Standard 503. Admissions Test).
49. Id. at 32–33 (Standard 507. Student Loan Programs).
50. Id. at 12 (Standard 206(a). Diversity and Inclusion).
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Consistent with this command-and-control approach, the ABA could, 
and should, revise the standards to proscribe merit scholarship negotiation 
altogether. If it did so, the ABA could put an end to the practice overnight. 
This, in turn, would require law schools to offer initial scholarship awards that 
reflect the full measure of merit they think appropriate based on the student’s 
credentials and characteristics. In short, the ABA could, and should, close the 
aid gap.
B. ABA Mandatory Disclosure
Negotiation scholars have found that context affects whether men and 
women will initiate negotiation. In conditions of ambiguity or uncertainty, 
men are much more likely than women to initiate negotiation, but when 
circumstances make clear that it is appropriate to initiate negotiation, the 
gender disparity in the propensity to ask seems to disappear.51
This research suggests that the ABA could limit, if not eliminate, the aid 
gap by requiring law schools to disclose their merit scholarship negotiation 
practices and to invite all of their admitted students to ask for adjustments to 
their scholarship awards.
The ABA Standards are replete with mandatory disclosure obligations 
of this type. Standard 509, for example, requires law schools to report their 
admissions data, tuition and fees, living costs, financial aid, enrollment data, 
course offerings, class sizes, employment outcomes, bar passage data, etc.52
 
Perhaps of greatest relevance to this Essay, Standard 509 requires law schools 
to disclose information about “conditional scholarships.” A conditional 
scholarship is a “financial aid award, the retention of which is dependent upon 
the student maintaining a minimum grade point average or class standing.”53
 
Rather than banning conditional scholarships, the ABA requires law schools 
to report conditional scholarships on their websites. Law schools must identify 
not only the number of students to whom they award conditional scholarships 
but also the number of students whose scholarships they reduce or eliminate 
because the students fail to meet minimum GPA or class standing criteria.
During the 2017-2018 academic year, for example, Tulane Law School 
enrolled 173 students with conditional scholarships and eliminated or reduced 
conditional scholarships for 35 other students.54
 
Gonzaga Law School 
51. Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a Large 
Scale Natural Field Experiment, 61 mgmt. scI. 2016 (2015) (finding no gender differences in 
propensity to ask when there was an explicit statement that the wages are negotiable). See also 
Kugler et al., supra note 34, at 213 (finding that gender differences are far smaller when there 
is minimal situational ambiguity regarding the appropriateness of negotiation); Jens Mazei 
et al., A Meta-Analysis on Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcomes and Their Moderators, 141 Psychol. 
Bull. 85, 93–97 (2015) (finding that differences in the propensity to ask were reduced when 
the bargaining range was shared with the negotiator).
52. ABA stAndArds And rules, supra note 43, at 33–34 (Standard 509. Required Disclosures).
53. Id. at 34 (Interpretation 509-3).
54. tul. u., stAndArd 509 InFormAtIon rePorts 2 (2018), https://law-dev.tulane.edu/sites/
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enrolled 115 students with conditional scholarships and eliminated or reduced 
conditional scholarships for 28 other students.55
 
Baylor Law School enrolled 
143 students with conditional scholarships but did not reduce or eliminate any 
conditional scholarships that year.56
 
And other schools, like Boston College57
 
and the University of Kentucky,58
 
did not award any conditional scholarships 
at all. The ABA requires law schools not only to disclose this information 
on their websites but also to provide it directly to any prospective student to 
whom they offer a conditional scholarship.59
Consistent with its approach to conditional scholarships, the ABA should, 
at a minimum, require each law school to provide both the public and 
admitted students with information about merit scholarship negotiation at 
that school. Further, the ABA should mandate that each school disclose not 
only a qualitative description of its merit negotiation policies and practices but 
also the quantitative data on scholarship adjustments. Specifically, the ABA 
should require each school to report the number of students who requested 
adjustment to their aid awards, the number of adjustments granted, and 
the dollar amounts of those adjustments (perhaps at the 25th, 50th, and 75th
 
percentiles).
Several law schools have taken it upon themselves to inform applicants 
about some aspects of their scholarship “reconsideration” processes. For 
example, the University of Texas School of Law devotes a section of its website 
to the “Scholarship Reconsideration Process for Incoming Students.”60
 
There, 
it makes clear that the school “will not engage in a bidding competition,” but 
provides a “one-time review . . . limited matching opportunity” in order to 
“consider scholarship offers from similarly ranked schools along with other 
factors such as merit and need.”61 Likewise, the University of California 
Berkeley School of Law provides a “formal process to request reconsideration” 
of a scholarship award “in light of an offer from another law school,” but limits 
law.tulane.edu/files/Files/ABA%20Reports/std509inforeport-65-65-12-07-2018-14-40-48.
pdf.
55. gonz. u., stAndArd 509 InFormAtIon rePort 2 (2018), https://www.gonzaga.edu/-/media/
Website/Documents/Academics/School-of-Law/About/Consumer-Information/2018-509-
Standard-Report.ashx?la=en&hash=E4980352385C646FF36327B457042E3D886B812B.
56. BAylor u., stAndArd 509 InFormAtIon rePort 2 (2018), https://www.baylor.edu/law/doc.
php/269444.pdf.
57. B.c., stAndArd 509 InFormAtIon rePort 2 (2019), https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/
schools/law/about/facts/Std509InfoReport.pdf.
58. u. ky., stAndArd 509 InFormAtIon rePort 2 (2018), http://law.uky.edu/sites/law.uky.edu/
files/Marketing/Standard%20509%20Report%20-%202018.pdf.
59. ABA stAndArds And rules, supra note 43, at 34 (Standard 509(d)).
60. u. tex. AustIn sch. l., Applying for Financial Aid, https://law.utexas.edu/financial-aid/the-
financial-aid-process/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
61. Id.
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the process to a window between March 20 and May 1.62 The University of 
Georgia School of Law63
 
invites admitted students to request reconsideration 
of the current scholarship offer through a form wherein they may upload 
documentation of other scholarship offers. The Chicago-Kent College of Law 
does the same, but limits documentation to a maximum of four competing 
offers and promises a response “within one or two weeks.”64
 
Meanwhile, the 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law provides admitted students a form upon 
which they may submit their “top competing offer” from select schools––
Chicago, Columbia, Duke, Harvard, Michigan, NYU, Penn, Stanford, UC 
Berkeley, UVA, and Yale.65
 
Students can upload supporting documentation as 
well as an essay in which they can explain why they would attend Northwestern 
over the other school in the case that the two scholarship offers are equal.66
Similarly, the SMU Dedman School of Law offers admitted students 
a “one-time” scholarship reconsideration request, though it makes clear that 
“[a]s a general rule” it will “not negotiate scholarship offers, nor . . . adjust 
awards based on other offers received.”67
We applaud those law schools that disclose information about merit 
scholarship negotiation, but we do not believe these disclosures are sufficient 
for two reasons. First, some law schools provide disclosures, but others do not. 
Second, even those schools that disclose some information about their merit 
scholarship reconsideration practices do not provide enough information to 
guide applicants. If the ABA were to adopt a mandatory disclosure regime, 
it could address both of these deficiencies by requiring that all law schools 
disclose specified information in a uniform way in public and in scholarship 
offer letters to admitted students. That information should include a 
description of each school’s merit scholarship negotiation policy and detailed 
information on outcomes. In so doing, the ABA would ensure that applicants 
are aware of their opportunity to ask for additional aid as well as the likelihood 
of success in doing so.
62. u. cAl. Berkeley sch. l., Scholarships, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/admitted- students-jd/
apply-for-a-scholarship/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
63. u. gA. sch. l., University of Georgia School of Law Scholarship Offer Reconsideration, http://law.uga.
edu/scholarship-offer-reconsideration (last visited Jan. 27, 2019); see also cAP. u. lAW sch., 
Scholarship Comparison, http://law.capital.edu/ScholarshipComparison/ (last visited Jan. 27, 
2019) (limiting applicants to “copies of scholarship offers from the top 2 institutions that are 
being considered in addition to Capital Law”).
64. chI. kent c. l., Scholarship Appeals, https://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/current-students/tuition-
and-financial-assistance/scholarships/scholarship-appeals (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
65. nW. PrItzker sch. l., Scholarship Reconsideration Form 2018, https://apply.law.northwestern.
edu/register/JDreconsideration2018 (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
66. Id.
67. smu dedmAn sch. l., Paying for Law School: Incoming Students, https://www.smu.edu/Law/
Admissions/AdmittedStudents/Paying-for-Law-School (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (stating 
that the “The Committee will not adjust awards based on prestige/rankings of other schools/
offers”).
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C. If the ABA Passes . . .
We believe the aid gap calls for a regulatory solution, so we recommend 
that the ABA ban merit scholarship negotiation, or, at a minimum, require law 
schools to disclose merit scholarship negotiation practices and outcomes. But 
we recognize the ABA may be unwilling or unable to regulate merit scholarship 
negotiation. In that event, we urge other legal education stakeholders to 
attempt to fill the void.
The Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) is a member services 
organization that does not regulate law schools but provides admissions support 
to law schools and applicants. The LSAC promulgates a “Statement of Good 
Admission and Financial Aid Practices” that prescribes how the admissions 
officers at member law schools are expected to conduct themselves.68
The LSAC’s Statement, like the ABA standards, addresses admissions 
and financial aid practices and policies in various ways. It underscores that 
“access to legal education often depends on access to financial assistance” and 
advises law schools to ensure that the financial aid process provides “accurate, 
coherent, and complete information” to admitted students and applicants. 
The LSAC’s Statement also recognizes that some law schools engage in merit 
scholarship negotiation, and it advises law schools to “develop fair, coherent, 
and consistent policies in their scholarship awarding process and (if applicable) 
scholarship revision or reconsideration requests.”69
The LSAC could take this a step further and advise against merit 
scholarship negotiations altogether or at least delineate merit scholarship 
negotiation disclosures it expects of admissions and financial aid offices. 
Though the Statement is non-binding, it has considerable normative force in 
the admissions world. There is good reason to believe that a strong assertion 
by the LSAC would shape how admissions and financial aid officers behave.
Law schools, too, can take steps to address the aid gap. Law schools can 
individually decide to cease merit scholarship negotiation or, alternatively, to 
provide extensive disclosures about their own merit scholarship negotiation 
practices and outcomes. Law schools could also band together to eliminate 
the practice. Although often in competition with one another, law schools 
have occasionally collaborated on issues of concern to legal education writ 
large. Most recently, law schools joined forces to advocate for flexibility in 
68. lsAc, LSAC Member Law Schools’ Statement of Good Admission and Financial Aid Practices (2017), 
https://www.lsac.org/sites/default/files/media/statement-of-good-admission_0.pdf.
69. Id (emphasis added).
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admissions testing70
 
and to propose a new clerkship hiring plan.71
 
In much the 
same way, law schools could agree amongst themselves to prohibit the practice 
of scholarship negotiation.
Law schools can also play a role by encouraging the negotiation experts 
on their faculties to teach negotiation to undergraduates or to do negotiation 
workshops for the pre-law groups on their campuses. Universities often teach 
negotiation at the graduate or professional level––in law schools, business 
schools, public policy schools, and so forth––but seldom at the undergraduate 
level. This is unfortunate because negotiation researchers have found that 
negotiation training can eliminate or at least reduce the gender-based asking 
gap.72
 
Indeed, when women lawyers are trained to negotiate, gendered 
differences in negotiation vanish.73
 
By training prospective law students 
to negotiate at the undergraduate level, law schools could minimize any 
subsequent gender differences in the merit scholarship negotiation process in 
law schools.
Conclusion
In this Essay, we have argued that the practice of merit scholarship 
negotiation in law schools can lead to an aid gap based on gender. We have focused 
on law schools because those are the schools we know best, and we have 
focused on gender because the research literature on gender and the propensity 
to negotiate is robust.
But the problem we have identified in this Essay is likely much larger 
than we have indicated for at least two reasons. First, although the research 
on gender in negotiation is more mature and voluminous, there is research 
suggesting that students from other historically disadvantaged populations––
racial and ethnic minorities, disabled students, LGBTQI students, and 
poorer students––are also likely to face an aid gap.74
 
Second, merit scholarship 
negotiation is a common practice not only in law schools but also in other 
70. David M. Klieger et al., The Validity of GRE® General Test Scores for Predicting 
Academic Performance at U.S. Law Schools, ets res. reP. serIes 1 (2018), https://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ets2.12213; Stephanie Francis Ward, 
After Withdrawal of Law School Admissions Test Rule Revision, Will Fewer Schools Accept the 
GRE?, ABA J. (Aug. 9, 2018, 6:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
following_withdrawl_of_admissions_test_rule_revision_will_fewer_schools_acc.
71. See, e.g., Federal Law Clerk Hiring Plan, OSCAR, https://oscar.uscourts.gov/federal_law_clerk_
hiring_pilot (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
72. See, e.g., Schneider et al., Likeability, supra note 40, at 381.
73. Id.
74. See Taylor supra note 17, at 48–49; Michael Z. Green, Negotiating While Black, in the negotIAtor’s 
desk reFerence 563, 565–67 (Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017) 
(recounting studies finding that minority individuals were induced to pay much higher 
prices when purchasing a car and that uncertainty about whether a salary was negotiable led 
to wage gaps).
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graduate and undergraduate schools,75
 
suggesting that there are aid gaps, 
based on gender as well as other protected statuses, not only in law schools 
but across educational institutions.
The ABA, LSAC, and law schools can play a pivotal role on campus by 
acknowledging the aid gap and taking steps to close it. We have argued here 
that the ABA should simply ban the practice, but if the ABA resists command-
and-control regulation, it can mandate disclosure, which would go a long 
way toward ensuring transparency and fairness in the process. Concurrently, 
the LSAC and the law schools themselves can take steps to reduce, if not 
eliminate, the practice in law schools. In so doing, legal education can lead 
the way on campus. Given the emphasis our discipline places on transparency, 
non-discrimination, and justice, this would be fitting.
75. Ron Lieber, Appealing to a College for More Financial Aid, n.y. tImes (Apr. 4, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/your-money/paying-for-college/for-many-families-college-
financial-aid-packages-are-worth-an-appeal.html (discussing the process of requesting 
scholarship and financial aid reconsideration at undergraduate institutions).
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